Confederation.
It declares 'that the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively.'
In the Constitution of the United States, which superseded the Articles of Confederation, the corresponding provision is found in section two of the fourth article, in the following words: 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the several States.'
There can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions is the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same in each. In the article of the Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase.
Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the Constitution. The first and the leading case on the subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823.
'The inquiry,' he says, 'is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. . . .'
This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States [Footnote 15] is adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward v. The State of Maryland, while it declines to undertake an authoritative definition beyond what was necessary to that decision. [Note A] The description, when taken to include others not named, but which are of the same general character, embraces nearly every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized government is instituted. They are, in the language of Judge Washington, those rights which are FUNDAMENTAL. Throughout his opinion, they are spoken of as rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State. [Footnote 16] They are so spoken of in the constitutional provision which he was construing. And they have always been held to be the class of rights which the State governments were created to establish and secure. "The Constitution of the United States provides that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. This can only apply to citizens who are, in their own States, entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens. Can it be shown that free negroes are such citizens in any one of the States as are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens? A citizen is he who is entitled to the freedom and privileges of the body politic, and has a share in its government. In Rome every citizen was enrolled in one of the thirtyfive tribes, and, consequently, had the right of suffrage. When we apply the term 'citizens' to the inhabitants of States, it means those who are members of the political community.
The civil law determined the condition of the son by that of the father. A man whose father was not a citizen was allowed to be a perpetual inhabitant, but not a citizen, unless citizenship was conferred on him. I consider him as a citizen of the United States, who is entitled to every personal right of a civil and political nature common to the great body of the political community. The distinguishing characteristic of a citizen of the United States is the possession of those capacities which a foreigner obtains by naturalization. Those are: 1st, a capacity to take a freehold; 2d, to vote at elections; 3d, to be elected, having the requisite qualifications of age, residence, and property. He who possesses these capacities is a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the clause of the constitution under consideration; and he who does not possess these capacities is not. "It seems, however, to have been lately suggested that a person admitted citizen of a State prior to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States was not a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The grounds for that opinion are not distinctly understood, but it seems altogether untenable.
The several States assumed the name of the United States in the very act by which they declared their independence; but being bound at that time by no compact, and having no common government, it was not till after the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, in the year 1781, that there could be any citizens of the United States.
The power of naturalization was not by those Articles vested in the general government, and remained, therefore, as every other power not thus delegated, with the States respectively. It was equally obvious that, unless express provision was made for the purpose, the union of the several States, whether by those Articles or by the subsequent adoption of the present Constitution, did not of itself create citizens of the United States or communicate to citizens of a State the right of citizenship in the several States. The power of granting or refusing that right to a citizen of another State would have remained as entire with the several States as that of naturalizing foreigners had no provision been introduced on the subject, first in the Articles of Confederation and afterwards in the Constitution. It was accordingly enacted, with a variation in the expression, by the Articles of Confederation, that the inhabitants, and by the Constitution, that the citizens, of each State should be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. There is no other provision affecting the subject in either of those instruments, except that in the present Constitution which gives to Congress the power of establishing an uniform rule of naturalization. And, a native (natural) born citizen of the United States was located at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, a naturalized citizen of the United States at Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
From the Slaughterhouse Cases there is the following:
(Page 74) "Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respective are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment." [Footnote 4] "The language is 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully used and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in the very sentence which precedes it. It is to clear for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted understandingly and with a purpose." "The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1) no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens.
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction." http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA587#v=onepage&q&f=false 5. ". . . It is, then, to the Fourteenth Amendment that the advocates of the congressional act must resort to find authority for its enactment, and to the first section of that amendment, which is as follows: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
In the first clause of this section, declaring who are citizens of the United States, there is nothing which touches the subject under consideration. The second clause, declaring that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' is limited, according to the decision of this court in SlaughterHouse Cases, to such privileges and immunities as belong to citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the State." Neal v. State of Delaware: 103 U.S. 370, at 406 (1880).
http://books.google.com/books?id=Y7wGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA406#v=onepage&q&f=false 6. "Referring to the same provision of the Constitution (that is; the second section of article 4), this court said, in SlaughterHouse Case, ubi supra, that it 'did not create those rights which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens. Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit, or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.' " United States v. Harris: 106 U.S. 629, at 643 thru 644 (1882). 8. "Another objection to the act is that it is in violation of section 2, art. 4, of the constitution of the United States, and of the fourteenth amendment, in that this act discriminates both as to persons and products. Section 2, art. 4, declares that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states; and the fourteenth amendment declares that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. But "Section 2 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States declares that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' In this there is no striking down of or limitation upon the right of a state to confer such immunities and privileges upon its citizens as it may deem fit. The clause of the constitution under consideration is protective merely, not destructive, nor yet even restrictive. Over and over again has the highest court of the United States so construed this provision. Thus, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it is said: 'The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the states. . . . . Nor did it profess to control the power of the state governments over the rights of its own citizens. Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states that whatever rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within your jurisdiction": See, also, Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418." In Re Johnson Estate: 96 Am. State Rep. 161, at 164; 73 Pac. Rep. 424; 139 Cal. 532 (1903) .
http://books.google.com/books?id=yiI8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA164#v=onepage&q&f=false 9. "The act was considered in Johnson v. United States, 160 U.S. 546, and we there held that a person who was not a citizen of the United States at the time of an alleged appropriation of his property by a tribe of Indians was not entitled to maintain an action in the Court of Claims under the act in question. There was not in that case, however, any assertion that the claimant was a citizen of a State as distinguished from a citizen of the United States. . . . Absent any unconstitutional discrimination, a state has the right to extent qualification for state office to its citizens, even though they are not citizens of the United States." Crosse v. Board of Supervisory of Election of Baltimore City: 243 Md. 555, 562; 221 A.2d 431, 436 (1966 "The Constitution forbids the abridging of the privileges of a citizen of the United States, but does not forbid the state from abridging the privileges of its own citizens.
The rights which a person has as a citizen of the United States are those which the Constitution and laws of the United States confer upon a citizen as a citizen of the United States. For instance, a man is a citizen of a state by virtue of his being resident there; but, if he moves into another state, he becomes at once a citizen there by operation of the Constitution (Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment) making him a citizen there; and needs no special naturalization, which, but for the Constitution, he would need.
On the other hand, the rights and privileges which a citizen of a state has are those which pertain to him as a member of society, and which would be his if his state were not a member of the Union. Over these the states have the usual power belonging to government, subject to the proviso that they shall not deny to any person within the jurisdiction (i.e., to their own citizens, the citizens of other states, or aliens) the equal protection of the laws. These powers extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, privileges, and properties of people, and of the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state. Federalist, No. 45" Hopkins v. City of Richmond: 86 S. E. Rep. 139, at 145; 117 Va. 692; Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1114 (1915 , citing the entire opinion of Town of Ashland v. Coleman, in its opinion (per curiam); overruled on other grounds, Irvine v. City of Clifton Forge: 97 S. E. Rep. 310, 310; 124 Va. 781 (1918) ". . . It is contended that the 1st section of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated? That section declares that 'all persons born in the United States are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside,' and provides that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' This section, after declaring that all persons born in the United States shall be citizens (1) of the United States and (2) of the State wherein they reside, goes on in the same sentence to provide that no State shall abridge the privileges of citizens of the United States; but does not go on to forbid a State from abridging the privileges of its own citizens. Leaving the matter of abridging the privileges of its own citizens to the discretion of each State, the section proceeds, in regard to the latter, only to provide that no State 'shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . .
The rights which a person has a citizen of a State are those which pertain to him as a member of society, and which would belong to him if his State were not a member of the American Union. Over these the States have the usual powers belonging to government, and these powers 'extend to all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, (privileges), and properties of people; and of the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. Federalist, No. 45. . . . On the other hand, the rights which a person has as a citizen of the United States are such as he has by virtue of his State being a member of the American Union under the provisions of our National Constitution. For instance, a man is a citizen of a State by virtue of his being native and resident there; but, if he emigrates into another State he becomes at once a citizen there by operation of the provision of the Constitution (Section 1, Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment) making him a citizen there; and needs no special naturalization, which, but for the Constitution, he would need to become a citizen." Ex Parte Edmund Kinney: 3 Hughes 9, at 12 thru 14 (1879) 14. ". . . The only question to be considered, so far as the law is concerned, is whether its necessary result is the taxation of such property. The proposition is maintained, and is undoubtedly correct, that, before property can be taxed, it must have become identified and incorporated with the general mass of property in the state. Live stock in this state is, in the greater part, maintained by feeding or grazing upon the natural grasses of the soil. In the case of some kinds of live stock, they are largely allowed to roam at will, but over territory more or less confined in extent. With sheep the custom is to keep them in convenient flocks or herds, intrusted to herders, and to direct them from place to place, generally as to a particular herd, in some certain locality, but covering in most cases a rather large and indeterminate territory. They are thus maintained until in proper condition for disposition, shipment, or other purposes of the owner. The only way in which such property becomes identified and incorporated with the other property of the state is by being turned at large or herded, to be maintained by grazing. Whether the purpose is that they shall remain in the state permanently or not, is not a determining factor. Such a purpose does not exist in the case of the greater proportion of all the live stock in the state. The object of a cattle grower is to ship out the state his cattle, as soon as they arrive at the proper age, size, or condition. To some extent that is also the purpose which the sheep owner has in view. When live stock are brought into this state to graze they are here to be maintained. While here for that purpose, they are as fully identified and incorporated with the other property of the state as it is possible for most of our live stock to become. The length of time that such property remains cuts no figure, if the purpose aforesaid is present. No question of interstate commerce is involved in such case which militates against the exercise by the state of its power of taxation. Neither, in that event, is a citizen of another state deprived of any of the immunities or privileges of a citizen of this state, nor is the state attempting to make or enforce a law which abridges the rights of a citizen of the United States. . . . A statute of Washington taxing live stock brought into that state to graze was upheld in all respects, but the question was apparently not presented, nor was it discussed in the opinion of the court whether any provision of the federal constitution was infringed upon. http://books.google.com/books?id=6wsLAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA596#v=onepage&q&f=false
